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Abstract
Entropic uncertainty relations are quantitative characterizations of Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle, which make use of an entropy measure to quantify uncertainty.
In quantum cryptography, they are often used as convenient tools in security proofs.
We propose a new entropic uncertainty relation. It is the first such uncertainty
relation that lower bounds the uncertainty in the measurement outcome for all but one
choice for the measurement from an arbitrarily large (but specifically chosen) set of
possible measurements, and, at the same time, uses the min-entropy as entropy mea-
sure, rather than the Shannon entropy. This makes it especially suited for quantum
cryptography.
As application, we propose a new quantum identification scheme in the bounded-
quantum-storage model. Because the scheme requires a perfectly single-qubit source
to operate securely, it is currently mainly of theoretical interest. Our new uncertainty
relation forms the core of the new scheme’s security proof in the bounded-quantum-
storage model. In contrast to the original quantum identification scheme proposed
by Damg˚ard et al., our new scheme also offers some security in case the bounded-
quantum-storage assumption fails to hold. Specifically, our scheme remains secure
against an adversary that has unbounded storage capabilities but is restricted to non-
adaptive single-qubit operations. The scheme by Damg˚ard et al., on the other hand,
completely breaks down under such an attack.
NJB is supported by an NWO Open Competition grant. CGG is supported by Spanish
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1 Introduction
1.1 A New Uncertainty Relation
In this work, we propose and prove a new general entropic uncertainty relation. Uncer-
tainty relations are quantitative characterizations of the uncertainty principle of quantum
mechanics, which expresses that for certain pairs of measurements, there exists no state
for which the measurement outcome is determined for both measurements: at least one
of the outcomes must be somewhat uncertain. Entropic uncertainty relations express this
uncertainty in at least one of the measurement outcomes by means of an entropy measure,
usually the Shannon entropy. Our new entropic uncertainty relation distinguishes itself
from previously known uncertainty relations by the following collection of features:
1. It uses the min-entropy as entropy measure, rather than the Shannon entropy. Such
an uncertainty relation is sometimes also called a high-order entropic uncertainty
relation.1 Since privacy amplification needs a lower bound on the min-entropy, high-
order entropic uncertainty relations are useful tools in quantum cryptography.
2. It lower bounds the uncertainty in the measurement outcome for all but one mea-
surement, chosen from an arbitrary (and arbitrarily large) family of possible mea-
surements. This is clearly stronger than typical entropic uncertainty relations that
lower bound the uncertainty on average (over the choice of the measurement).
3. The measurements can be chosen to be qubit-wise measurements, in the computa-
tional or Hadamard basis, and thus the uncertainty relation is applicable to practical
schemes (which can be implemented using current technology).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous entropic uncertainty relation satisfies (1)
and (2) simultaneously, let alone in combination with (3). Indeed, as pointed out in a
recent overview article by Wehner and Winter [WW10], little is known about entropic
uncertainty relations for more than two measurement outcomes, and even less when addi-
tionally considering min-entropy.
To explain our new uncertainty relation, we find it helpful to first discuss a simpler
variant, which does not satisfy (1), and which follows trivially from known results. Fix an
arbitrary family {B1, . . . ,Bm} of bases for a given quantum system (i.e., Hilbert space).
The maximum overlap of such a family is defined as
c := max{|〈φ|ψ〉| : |φ〉 ∈ Bj , |ψ〉 ∈ Bk, 1≤j<k≤m},
and let d := − log(c2). Let ρ be an arbitrary quantum state of that system, and let X
denote the measurement outcome when ρ is measured in one of the bases. We model the
choice of the basis by a random variable J , so that H(X|J = j) denotes the Shannon en-
tropy of the measurement outcome when ρ is measured in basis Bj . It follows immediately
from Maassen and Uffink’s uncertainty relation [MU88] that
H(X|J = j) +H(X|J = k) ≥ − log(c2) = d ∀j 6= k.
As a direct consequence, there exists a choice j′ for the measurement so that H(X|J =
j) ≥ d2 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with j 6= j′. In other words, for any state ρ there exists
1This is because the min-entropy coincides with the Re´nyi entropy Hα of high(est) order α = ∞. In
comparison, the Shannon entropy coincides with the Re´nyi entropy of (relatively) low order α = 1.
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j′ so that unless the choice for the measurement coincides with j′, which happens with
probability at most maxj PJ(j), there is at least d/2 bits of entropy in the outcome X.
Our new high-order entropic uncertainty relation shows that this very statement es-
sentially still holds when we replace Shannon by min-entropy, except that j′ becomes
randomized: for any ρ, there exists a random variable J ′, independent of J , such that2
Hmin(X|J=j, J ′=j′) &
d
2
∀ j 6= j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
no matter what the distribution of J is. Thus, unless the measurement J coincides with
J ′, there is roughly d/2 bits of min-entropy in the outcome X. Furthermore, since J ′ is
independent of J , the probability that J coincides with J ′ is at most maxj PJ(j), as is the
case for a fixed J ′.
Note that we have no control over (the distribution of) J ′. We can merely guarantee
that it exists and is independent of J . It may be insightful to interpret J ′ as a virtual guess
for J , guessed by the party that prepares ρ, and whose goal is to have little uncertainty
in the measurement outcome X. The reader may think of the following specific way of
preparing ρ: sample j′ according to some arbitrary distribution J ′, and then prepare the
state as the, say, first basis vector of Bj′ . If the resulting mixture ρ is then measured in
some basis Bj , sampled according to an arbitrary (independent) distribution J , then unless
j = j′ (i.e., our guess for j was correct), there is obviously lower bounded uncertainty in
the measurement outcome X (assuming a non-trivial maximum overlap). Our uncertainty
relation can be understood as saying that for any state ρ, no matter how it is prepared,
there exists such a (virtual) guess J ′, which exhibits this very behavior: if it differs from
the actual choice for the measurement then there is lower bounded uncertainty in the
measurement outcome X. As an immediate consequence, we can for instance say that X
has min-entropy at least d/2, except with a probability that is given by the probability of
guessing J , e.g., except with probability 1/m if the measurement is chosen uniformly at
random from the family. This is clearly the best we can hope for.
We stress that because the min-entropy is more conservative than the Shannon entropy,
our high-order entropic uncertainty relation does not follow from its simpler Shannon-
entropy version. Neither can it be deduced in an analogous way; the main reason being
that for fixed pairs j 6= k, there is no strong lower bound onHmin(X|J=j)+Hmin(X|J=k),
in contrast to the case of Shannon entropy. More precisely and more generally, the average
uncertainty 1|J |
∑
jHmin(X|J = j) does not allow a lower bound higher than log |J |. To
see this, consider the following example for |J | = 2 (the example can easily be extended
to arbitrary |J |). Suppose that ρ is the uniform mixture of two pure states, one giving no
uncertainty when measured in basis j, and the other giving no uncertainty when measured
in basis k. Then, 12Hmin(X|J= j) + 12Hmin(X|J=k) = 1. Because of a similar reason, we
cannot hope to get a good bound for all but a fixed choice of j′; the probabilistic nature
of J ′ is necessary (in general). Hence, compared to bounding the average uncertainty,
the all-but-one form of our uncertainty relation not only makes our uncertainty relation
stronger in that uncertainty for all-but-one implies uncertainty on average (yet not vice
versa), but it also allows for more uncertainty.
By using asymptotically good error-correcting codes, one can construct families of
bases that have a large value of d, and thus for which our uncertainty relation guarantees
a large amount of min-entropy (we discuss this in more detail in Section 3.2). These
families consist of qubit-wise measurements in the computational or the Hadamard basis,
hence these measurements can be performed with current technology.
2The rigorous version of the approximate inequality & is stated in Theorem 9.
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The proof of our new uncertainty relation comprises a rather involved probability
reasoning to prove the existence of the random variable J ′ and builds on earlier work
presented in [Sch07].
1.2 Quantum Identification with “Hybrid” Security
As an application of our entropic uncertainty relation, we propose a new quantum identi-
fication protocol. Informally, the goal of (password-based) identification is to prove knowl-
edge of a possibly low-entropy password w, without giving away any information on w
(beyond what is unavoidable). In [DFSS07], Damg˚ard et al. showed the existence of such
an identification protocolin the bounded-quantum-storage model (BQSM). This means that
the proposed protocol involves the communication of qubits, and security is proven against
any dishonest participant that can store only a limited number of these qubits (whereas
legitimate participants need no quantum storage at all to honestly execute the protocol).
Our uncertainty relation gives us the right tool to prove security of the new quantum
identification protocol in the BQSM. The distinguishing feature of our new protocol is
that it also offers some security in case the assumption underlying the BQSM fails to
hold. Indeed, we additionally prove security of our new protocol against a dishonest
server that has unbounded quantum-storage capabilities and can reliably store all the
qubits communicated during an execution of the protocol, but is restricted to non-adaptive
single-qubit operations and measurements.3 This is in sharp contrast to protocol QID by
Damg˚ard et al., which completely breaks down against a dishonest server that can store all
the communicated qubits in a quantum memory and postpone the measurements until the
user announces the correct measurement bases. On the downside, our protocol only offers
security in case of a perfectly single-qubit (e.g. single-photon) source, because multi-qubit
emissions reveal information about w. Hence, given the immature state of single-qubit-
source technology at the time of this writing, our protocol is currently mainly of theoretical
interest.
We want to stress that proving security of our protocol in this single-qubit-operations
model (SQOM) is non-trivial. Indeed, as we will see, standard tools like privacy ampli-
fication are not applicable. Our proof relies on a certain minimum-distance property of
random binary matrices and makes use of Diaconis and Shahshahani’s XOR inequality
(Theorem 1, see also [Dia88]).
1.3 Related Work
The study of entropic uncertainty relations, whose origin dates back to 1957 with the
work of Hirschman [HJ57], has received a lot of attention over the last decade due to their
various applications in quantum information theory. We refer the reader to [WW10] for a
recent overview on entropic uncertainty relations. Most of the known entropic uncertainty
relations are of the form
1
|J |
∑
j
Hα(X|J=j) ≥ h ,
where Hα is the Re´nyi entropy.
4 I.e., most uncertainty relations only give a lower bound
on the entropy of the measurement outcome X on average over the (random) choice
3It is known that some restriction is necessary (see [DFSS07]).
4The Re´nyi entropy [Re´n61] is defined as Hα(X) :=
1
1−α
log
∑
x
PX(x)
α. Nevertheless, for most known
uncertainty relations α = 1, i.e. the Shannon entropy.
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of the measurement. As argued in Section 1.1, the bound h on the min-entropy can
be at most log |J |, no matter the range of X. Furthermore, an uncertainty relation of
this form only guarantees that there is uncertainty in X for some measurement(s), but
does not specify precisely for how many, and certainly it does not guarantee uncertainty
for all but one measurements. The same holds for the high-order entropic uncertainty
relation from [DFR+07], which considers an exponential number of measurement settings
and guarantees that except with negligible probability over the (random) choice of the
measurement, there is lower-bounded min-entropy in the outcome. On the other hand, the
high-order entropic uncertainty relation from [DFSS05] only considers two measurement
settings and guarantees lower-bounded min-entropy with probability (close to) 12 .
The uncertainty relation we know of that comes closest to ours is Lemma 2.13 in [FHS11].
Using our notation, it shows that X is ǫ-close to having roughly d/2 bits of min-entropy
(i.e., the same bound we get), but only for all but an ǫ-fraction of all the m possible choices
for the measurement j, where ǫ is about
√
2/m.
With respect to our application, backing up the security of the identification proto-
col by Damg˚ard et al. [DFSS07] against an adversary that can overcome the quantum-
memory bound assumed by the BQSM was also the goal of [DFL+09]. However, the
solution proposed there relies on an unproven computational-hardness assumption, and
as such, strictly speaking, can be broken by an adversary in the SQOM, i.e., by storing
qubits and measuring them later qubit-wise and performing (possibly infeasible) classical
computations. On the other hand, by assuming a lower bound on the hardness of the un-
derlying computational problem against quantum machines, the security of the protocol
in [DFL+09] holds against an adversary with much more quantum computing power than
our protocol in the SQOM, which restricts the adversary to single-qubit operations.
We hope that with future research on this topic, new quantum identification (or other
cryptographic) protocols will be developed with security in the same spirit as our protocol,
but with a more relaxed restriction on the adversary’s quantum computation capabilities,
for instance that he can only perform a limited number of quantum computation steps,
and in every step he can only act on a limited number of qubits coherently.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Notation
Sets as well as families are written using a calligraphic font, e.g. A,X , and we write |A|
etc. for the cardinality. We use [n] as a shorthand for {1, . . . , n}.
For an n-bit vector vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) in {0, 1}n, we write |v| for its Hamming
weight, and, for any subset I ⊆ [n], we write vI for the restricted vector (vi)i∈I ∈ {0, 1}|I|.
For two vectors v,w ∈ {0, 1}n, the Schur product is defined as the element-wise product
v⊙w := (v1w1, v2w2, . . . , vnwn) ∈ {0, 1}n, and the inner product between v and w is given
by v ·w := v1w1⊕ · · · ⊕ vnwn ∈ {0, 1}, where the addition is modulo 2. We write span(F )
for the row span of a matrix F ; the set of vectors obtained by making all possible linear
combinations (modulo 2) of the rows of F , i.e. the set {sF : ∀s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ}, where s should
be interpreted as a row vector and sF denotes a vector-matrix product.
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2.2 Probability Theory
A finite probability space is a non-empty finite set Ω together with a function Pr : Ω→ R
such that Pr(ω) ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω and∑ω∈Ω Pr(ω) = 1. An event is a subset of Ω. A random
variable is a function X : Ω → X from a finite probability space (Ω,Pr) to a finite set
X . We denote random variables as capital letters, for example X, Y , Z. The distribution
of X, which we denote as PX , is given by PX(x) = Pr[X = x] = Pr[{ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) =
x}]. The joint distribution of two (or more) random variables X and Y is denoted by
PXY , i.e., PXY (x, y) = Pr[X = x ∧ Y = y]. Specifically, we write UX for the uniform
probability distribution over X . Usually, we leave the probability space (Ω,Pr) implicit,
and understand random variables to be defined by their joint distribution, or by some
“experiment” that uniquely determines their joint distribution.
Random variables X and Y are independent if PXY = PXPY (which should be under-
stood as PXY (x, y) = PX(x)PY (y) ∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y). The random variables X, Y and Z
form a (first-order) Markov chain, denoted by X ↔ Y ↔ Z, if PXZ|Y = PX|Y PZ|Y . The
statistical distance (also knows as variational distance) between distributions PX and PY
is written as SD(PX , PY ) :=
1
2‖PX − PY ‖1.
The bias of a binary random variable X is defined as bias(X) :=
∣∣PX(0) − PX(1)∣∣.
This also naturally defines the bias of X conditioned on an event E as bias(X|E) :=∣∣PX|E (0) − PX|E(1)∣∣. The bias thus ranges between 0 and 1 and can be understood as a
degree of predictability of a bit: if the bias is small then the bit is close to random, and
if the bias is large (i.e. approaches 1) then the bit has essentially no uncertainty. For a
sum of two independent binary random variables X1 and X2, the bias of the sum is the
product of the individual biases, i.e. bias(X1 ⊕X2) = bias(X1)bias(X2).
Theorem 1 (Diaconis and Shahshahani’s Information-Theoretic XOR Lemma). Let X
be a random variable over X := {0, 1}n with distribution PX . Then, the following holds,
SD(PX , UX ) ≤ 1
2
[ ∑
f∈{0,1}n\{0n}
bias(f ·X)2
] 1
2
.
The original version of Theorem 1 appeared in [Dia88], where it is expressed in the language
of representation theory. The version above is due to [NN93].
Theorem 2 (Hoeffding’s Inequality). Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be independent binary random
variables, each distributed according to the Bernoulli distribution with parameter µ, and
let X¯ := n−1
∑
i∈[n]Xi. Then for 0 < t < 1− µ
Pr[X¯ − µ ≥ t] ≤ exp(−2nt2).
For a proof, the reader is referred to [Hoe63].
2.3 Quantum Systems and States
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of quantum information
theory; the main purpose of this section is to fix some terminology and notation. A
quantum system A is associated with a complex Hilbert space, H = Cd, its state space.
By default, we write HA for the state space of system A, and ρA (respectively |ϕA〉 in case
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of a pure state) for the state of A. We write D(H) for the set of all density matrices on
Hilbert space H.
The state space of a bipartite quantum system AB, consisting of two (or more) sub-
systems, is given by HAB = HA ⊗ HB . If the state of AB is given by ρAB then the
state of subsystem A, when treated as a stand-alone system, is given by the partial trace
ρA = trB(ρAB), and correspondingly for B. Measuring a system A in basis {|i〉}i∈I , where
{|i〉}i∈I is an orthonormal basis of HA, means applying the measurement described by the
projectors {|i〉〈i|}i∈I , such that outcome i ∈ I is observed with probability pi = tr(|i〉〈i|ρA)
(respectively pi = |〈i|ϕA〉|2 in case of a pure state). IfA is a subsystem of a bipartite system
AB, then it means applying the measurement described by the projectors {|i〉〈i| ⊗ IB}i∈I ,
where IB is the identity operator on HB.
A qubit is a quantum system A with state space HA = C2. The computational basis
{|0〉, |1〉} (for a qubit) is given by |0〉 = (10) and |1〉 = (01), and the Hadamard basis by
{H|0〉,H|1〉}, where H denotes the 2-dimensional Hadamard matrix H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. We
also call the computational basis the plus basis and associate it with the ‘+’-symbol, and
we call the Hadamard basis the times basis and associate it with the ‘×’-symbol. For
bit vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n and v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ {+,×}n we then write
|x〉v = |x1〉vi ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉vn where |xi〉+ := |xi〉 and |xi〉× := H|xi〉.
Subsystem X of a bipartite quantum system XE is called classical, if the state of XE
is given by a density matrix of the form
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE ,
where X is a finite set of cardinality |X | = dim(HX), PX : X → [0, 1] is a probability
distribution, {|x〉}x∈X is some fixed orthonormal basis of HX , and ρxE is a density matrix
on HE for every x ∈ X . Such a state, called hybrid or cq- (for classical-quantum) state,
can equivalently be understood as consisting of a random variable X with distribution PX ,
taking on values in X , and a system E that is in state ρxE exactly when X takes on the
value x. This formalism naturally extends to two (or more) classical systems X, Y etc.
For any event E (defined by PE|X(x) = Pr[E|X = x] for all x), we may write
ρXE|E :=
∑
x
PX|E |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE.
If the state of XE satisfies ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE , where ρX = trE(ρXE) =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| and
ρE = trX(ρXE) =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E , then X is independent of E, and thus no information on
X can be obtained from system E. Moreover, if ρXE =
1
|X |IX ⊗ ρE , where IX denotes
the identity on HX , then X is random-and-independent of E. We also want to be able to
express that a random variable X is (close) to being independent of a quantum system E
when given a random variable Y . Formally, this is expressed by saying that ρXYE equals
ρX↔Y↔E, where
ρX↔Y↔E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE .
This notion, called conditional independence, for the quantum setting was introduced in
[DFSS07].
For a matrix ρ, the trace norm is defined as ‖ρ‖1 := tr
√
ρρ∗, where ρ∗ denotes the
Hermitian transpose of ρ.
Definition 3. The trace distance between two density matrices ρ, σ ∈ D(H) is defined as
δ(ρ, σ) := 12‖ρ− σ‖1.
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If two states ρ and σ are ε-close in trace distance, i.e. 12‖ρ − σ‖1 ≤ ε, we use ρ ≈ε σ
as shorthand. In case of classical states, the trace distance coincides with the statistical
distance. Moreover, the trace distance between two states cannot increase when applying
the same quantum operation (i.e., CPTP map) to both states. As a consequence, if ρ ≈ε σ
then the states cannot be distinguished with statistical advantage better than ε.
Definition 4. For a density matrix ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗ HE) with classical X, the distance
to uniform of X given E is defined as
dunif(X|E) := 12‖ρXE − ρU ⊗ ρE‖1,
where ρU :=
1
dim(HX)IX .
2.4 Min-Entropy and Privacy Amplification
We make use of Renner’s notion of the conditional min-entropy Hmin(ρAB |B) of a system
A conditioned on another system B [Ren05]. If the state ρAB is clear from the con-
text, we may write Hmin(A|B) instead of Hmin(ρAB |B). The formal definition is given by
Hmin(ρAB |B) := supσB max{h ∈ R : 2−h · IA⊗σB− ρAB ≥ 0} where the supremum is over
all density matrices σB on HB. If HB is the trivial space C, we obtain the unconditional
min-entropy of ρA, denoted as Hmin(ρA), which simplifies to Hmin(ρA) = − log λmax(ρA),
where λmax(ρA) is the largest eigenvalue of ρA.
We will need the following chain rule.
Lemma 5. For any density matrix ρ on HXY E with classical X and Y it holds that
Hmin(X|Y E) ≥ Hmin(X|Y )−Hmax(E).
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
For the special case of a hybrid state ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗ HE) with classical X, it is
shown in [KRS09] that the conditional min-entropy of a quantum state coincides with the
negative logarithm of the guessing probability conditional on quantum side information
pguess(X|E) := max{Mx}
∑
x
PX(x) tr(Mxρ
x
E),
where the latter is the probability that the party holding HE guesses X correctly using
the POVM {Mx}x on HE that maximizes pguess. Thus,
Hmin(X|E) = − log pguess(X|E). (1)
For random variables X and Y , we have that pguess(X|Y ) simplifies to
pguess(X|Y ) =
∑
y
PY (y)pguess(X|Y = y) =
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y).
Finally, we make use of Renner’s privacy amplification theorem [RK05, Ren05], as
given below. Recall that a function g : R × X → {0, 1}ℓ is called a universal (hash)
function, if for the random variable R, uniformly distributed over R, and for any distinct
x, y ∈ X : Pr[g(R,x)=g(R, y)] ≤ 2−ℓ.
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Theorem 6 (Privacy amplification). Let ρXE be a hybrid state with classical X. Let
g : R×X → {0, 1}ℓ be a universal hash function, and let R be uniformly distributed over
R, independent of X and E. Then K = g(R,X) satisfies
dunif(K|RE) ≤ 1
2
· 2− 12 (Hmin(X|E)−ℓ) .
Informally, Theorem 6 states that if X contains sufficiently more than ℓ bits of entropy
when given E, then ℓ nearly random-and-independent bits can be extracted from X.
3 The All-But-One Entropic Uncertainty Relation
Throughout this section, {B1, . . . ,Bm} is an arbitrary but fixed family of bases for the
state space H of a quantum system. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to an n-
qubit system, such that H = (C2)⊗n for n ∈ N, but our results immediately generalize
to arbitrary quantum systems. We write the 2n basis vectors of the j-th basis Bj as
Bj = {|x〉j : x ∈ {0, 1}n}. Let c be the maximum overlap of {B1, . . . ,Bm}, i.e.,
c := max{|〈x|j |y〉k| : x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, 1≤j <k≤m}.
In order to obtain our entropic uncertainty relation that lower bounds the min-entropy
of the measurement outcome for all but one measurement, we first show an uncertainty
relation that expresses uncertainty by means of the probability measure of given sets.
Theorem 7 (Theorem 4.18 in [Sch07]). Let ρ be an arbitrary state of n qubits. For
j ∈ [m], let Qj(·) be the distribution of the outcome when ρ is measured in the Bj-basis,
i.e., Qj(x) = 〈x|j ρ |x〉j for any x ∈ {0, 1}n.Then, for any family {Lj}j∈[m] of subsets
Lj ⊂ {0, 1}n, it holds that
∑
j∈[m]
Qj(Lj) ≤ 1 + c (m− 1) · max
j 6=k∈[m]
√
|Lj||Lk|.
A special case of Theorem 7, obtained by restricting the family of bases to the specific
choice {B+,B×} with B+ = {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n} and B× = {H⊗n|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n} (i.e.
either the computational or Hadamard basis for all qubits), is an uncertainty relation
that was proven and used in the original paper about the BQSM [DFSS05]. The proof of
Theorem 7 goes along similar lines as the proof in the journal version of [DFSS05] for the
special case outlined above. It is based on the norm inequality∥∥A1 + . . .+Am∥∥ ≤ 1 + (m− 1) · max
j 6=k∈[m]
∥∥AjAk∥∥ ,
which holds for arbitrary orthogonal projectors A1, . . . , Am. Recall that for a linear opera-
tor A on the complex Hilbert space H, the operator norm is defined as ‖A‖ := sup ‖A|ψ〉‖,
where the supremum is over all norm-1 |ψ〉 ∈ H; this is identical to ‖A‖ := sup |〈ϕ|A|ψ〉|,
where the supremum is over all norm-1 |ϕ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H. Furthermore, A is called an orthog-
onal projector if A2 = A and A∗ = A. The proof of this norm inequality can be found in
Appendix A. The proof of Theorem 7 is given here.
Proof of Theorem 7. For j ∈ [m], we define the orthogonal projectors Aj :=∑x∈Lj |x〉j〈x|j .
Using the spectral decomposition of ρ =
∑
w λw|ϕw〉〈ϕw| and the linearity of the trace, we
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have
∑
j∈[m]
Qj(Lj) =
∑
j∈[m]
tr(Ajρ) =
∑
j∈[m]
∑
w
λwtr(A
j |ϕw〉〈ϕw|) =
∑
w
λw
( ∑
j∈[m]
〈ϕw|Aj |ϕw〉
)
=
∑
w
λw〈ϕw|
( ∑
j∈[m]
Aj
)
|ϕw〉 ≤
∥∥∥∥ ∑
j∈[m]
Aj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1 + (m− 1) · maxj 6=k∈[m]
∥∥AjAk∥∥,
where the last inequality is the norm inequality (Proposition 26 in Appendix A). To
conclude, we show that ‖AjAk‖ ≤ c
√
|Lj ||Lk|. Let us fix j 6= k ∈ [m]. Note that by
the restriction on the overlap of the family of bases {Bj}j∈[m], we have that |〈x|j |y〉k| ≤ c
holds for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n. Then, with the sums over x and y understood as over x ∈ Lj
and y ∈ Lk, respectively,
∥∥∥AjAk|ψ〉∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥∥∑
x
|x〉j〈x|j
∑
y
|y〉k〈y|k|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∑
x
|x〉j
∑
y
〈x|j |y〉k 〈y|k|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
2
=
∑
x
∣∣∣∣∑
y
〈x|j |y〉k 〈y|k|ψ〉
∣∣∣∣
2
≤
∑
x
(∑
y
∣∣〈x|j |y〉k 〈y|k|ψ〉∣∣
)2
≤ c2
∑
x
(∑
y
∣∣〈y|k|ψ〉∣∣
)2
≤ c2
∣∣Lj∣∣∣∣Lk∣∣.
The third equality follows from Pythagoras, the first inequality holds by triangle inequality,
the second inequality by the bound on |〈x|j |y〉k|, and the last follows from Cauchy-Schwarz.
This implies ‖AjAk‖ ≤ c
√
|Lj||Lk| and finishes the proof.
In the same spirit as in (the journal version of) [DFSS05], we reformulate above uncer-
tainty relation in terms of a “good event” E , which occurs with reasonable probability, and
if it occurs, the measurement outcomes have high min-entropy. The statement is obtained
by choosing the sets Lj in Theorem 7 appropriately.
Because we now switch to entropy notation, it will be convenient to work with a
measure of overlap between bases that is logarithmic in nature and relative to the number
n of qubits. Hence, we define
δ := − 1
n
log c2 .
We will later see that for “good” choices of bases, δ stays constant for growing n.
Corollary 8. Let ρ be an arbitrary n-qubit state, let J be a random variable over [m]
(with arbitrary distribution PJ), and let X be the outcome when measuring ρ in basis BJ .5
Then, for any 0 < ǫ < δ/4, there exists an event E such that∑
j∈[m]
Pr[E|J=j] ≥ (m− 1)− (2m− 1) · 2−ǫn
and
Hmin(X|J=j, E) ≥
(δ
2
− 2ǫ
)
n
for j ∈ [m] with PJ |E(j) > 0.
5I.e., PX|J (x|j) = Q
j(x), using the notation from Theorem 7.
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Proof. For j ∈ [m] define
Sj := {x ∈ {0, 1}n : Qj(x) ≤ 2−(δ/2−ǫ)n}
to be the sets of strings with small probabilities and denote by Lj := Sj their com-
plements6. Note that for all x ∈ Lj, we have that Qj(x) > 2−(δ/2−ǫ)n and therefore
|Lj| < 2(δ/2−ǫ)n. It follows from Theorem 7 that∑
j∈[m]
Qj(Sj) =
∑
j∈[m]
(1−Qj(Lj)) ≥ m− (1 + (m− 1) · 2−ǫn) = (m− 1)− (m− 1)2−ǫn.
We define E := {X ∈ SJ ∧ QJ(SJ) ≥ 2−ǫn} to be the event that X ∈ SJ and
at the same time the probability that this happens is not too small. Then Pr[E|J =
j] = Pr[X ∈ Sj ∧ Qj(Sj) ≥ 2−ǫn|J = j] either vanishes (if Qj(Sj) < 2−ǫn) or else
equals Qj(Sj). In either case, Pr[E|J = j] ≥ Qj(Sj) − 2−ǫn holds and thus the first
claim follows by summing over j ∈ [m] and using the derivation above. Furthermore,
let p = maxj PJ(j), then Pr[E¯ ] =
∑
j∈[m] PJ(j)Pr[E¯ |J = j] ≤ p
∑
j∈[m]Pr[E¯ |J = j] ≤
p(m−(∑j∈[m]Qj(Sj)−2−ǫn)) ≤ p(1+(2m−1)·2−ǫn), and Pr[E ] ≥ (1−p)−p(2m−1)·2−ǫn
Regarding the second claim, in case J = j, we have
Hmin(X|J=j, E) = − log
(
max
x∈Sj
Qj(x)
Qj(Sj)
)
≥ − log
(
2−(δ/2−ǫ)n
Qj(Sj)
)
= (δ/2 − ǫ)n+ log(Qj(Sj)).
As Qj(Sj) ≥ 2−ǫn by definition of E , we have Hmin(X|J=j, E) ≥ (δ/2 − 2ǫ)n.
3.1 Main Result and Its Proof
We are now ready to state and prove our new all-but-one entropic uncertainty relation.
Theorem 9. Let ρ be an arbitrary n-qubit state, let J be a random variable over [m] (with
arbitrary distribution PJ), and let X be the outcome when measuring ρ in basis BJ . Then,
for any 0 < ǫ < δ/4, there exists a random variable J ′ with joint distribution PJJ ′X such
that (1) J and J ′ are independent and (2) there exists an event Ψ with Pr[Ψ] ≥ 1−2 ·2−ǫn
such that7
Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ = j′,Ψ) ≥
(δ
2
− 2ǫ
)
n− 1
for all j, j′ ∈ [m] with j 6= j′ and PJJ ′|Ψ(j, j′) > 0.
Note that, as phrased, Theorem 9 requires that J is fixed and known, and only then
the existence of J ′ can be guaranteed. This is actually not necessary. By looking at the
proof, we see that J ′ can be defined simultaneously in all m probability spaces PX|J=j
with j ∈ [m], without having assigned a probability distribution to J yet, so that the
resulting random variable J ′ we obtain by assigning an arbitrary probability distribution
PJ to J , satisfies the claimed properties. This in particular implies that the (marginal)
distribution of J ′ is fully determined by ρ.
6Here’s the mnemonic: S for the strings with Small probabilities, L for Large.
7Instead of introducing such an event Ψ, we could also express the min-entropy bound by means of
the smooth min-entropy of X given J = j and J ′ = j′.
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The idea of the proof of Theorem 9 is to (try to) define the random variable J ′ in such
a way that the event J 6= J ′ coincides with the “good event” E from Corollary 8. It then
follows immediately from Corollary 8 that Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ 6= J) ≥ (δ/2− 2ǫ)n, which is
already close to the actual min-entropy bound we need to prove. This approach dictates
that if the event E does not occur, then J ′ needs to coincide with J . Vice versa, if E does
occur, then J ′ needs to be different to J . However, it is a priori unclear how to choose J ′
different to J in case E occurs. There is only one way to set J ′ to be equal to J , but there
are many ways to set J ′ to be different to J (unless m = 2). It needs to be done in such
a way that without conditioning on E or its complement, J and J ′ are independent.
Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that the following does the job. To simplify this
informal discussion, we assume that the sum of the m probabilities Pr[E|J = j] from
Corollary 8 equals m− 1 exactly. It then follows that the corresponding complementary
probabilities, Pr[E¯ |J = j] for the m different choices of j ∈ [m], add up to 1 and thus
form a probability distribution. J ′ is now chosen, in the above spirit depending on the
event E , so that its marginal distribution PJ ′ coincides with this probability distribution:
PJ ′(j
′) = Pr[E¯ |J = j′] for all j′ ∈ [m]. Thus, in case the event E occurs, J ′ is chosen
according to this distribution but conditioned on being different to the value j, taken on
by J . The technical details, and how to massage the argument in case the sum of the
Pr[E|J=j]’s is not exactly m− 1, are worked out in the proof below.
Proof of Theorem 9. From Corollary 8 we know that for any 0 < ǫ < δ/4, there exists an
event E such that ∑j∈[m]Pr[E|J = j] = m− 1− α, and thus ∑j∈[m] Pr[E¯ |J = j] = 1 + α,
for −1 ≤ α ≤ (2m− 1)2−ǫn. We make a case distinction between α = 0, α > 0 and α < 0;
we start with the case α = 0, we subsequently prove the other two cases by reducing them
to the case α = 0 by “inflating” and “deflating” the event E appropriately. The approach
for the case α = 0 is to define J ′ in such way that E ⇐⇒ J 6= J ′, i.e., the event J 6= J ′
coincides with the event E . The min-entropy bound from Corollary 8 then immediately
translates to Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ 6= J) ≥ (δ/2 − 2ǫ)n, and to Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ = j′) ≥
(δ/2 − 2ǫ)n for j′ 6= j with PJJ ′(j, j′) > 0, as we will show. What is not obvious about
the approach is how to define J ′ when it is supposed to be different from J , i.e., when the
event E occurs, so that in the end J and J ′ are independent.
Formally, we define J ′ by means of the following conditional probability distributions:
PJ ′|JXE¯(j
′|j, x) :=
{
1 if j = j′
0 if j 6= j′ and PJ ′|JXE(j
′|j, x) :=


0 if j = j′
Pr[E¯ |J = j′]
Pr[E|J = j] if j 6= j
′
We assume for the moment that the denominator in the latter expression does not vanish
for any j; we take care of the case where it does later. Trivially, PJ ′|JXE¯ is a proper
distribution, with non-negative probabilities that add up to 1, and the same holds for
PJ ′|JXE :
∑
j′∈[m]
PJ ′|JXE¯ =
∑
j′∈[m]\{j}
PJ ′|JXE¯ =
∑
j′∈[m]\{j}
Pr[E¯ |J = j′]
Pr[E|J = j] = 1
where we used that
∑
j∈[m] Pr[E¯ |J = j] = 1 (because α = 0) in the last equality. Fur-
thermore, it follows immediately from the definition of J ′ that E¯ =⇒ J = J ′ and
E =⇒ J 6= J ′. Hence, E ⇐⇒ J 6= J ′, and thus the bound from Corollary 8 translates
to Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ 6= J) ≥ (δ/2 − 2ǫ)n. It remains to argue that J ′ is independent of J ,
and that the bound also holds for Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ = j′) whenever j 6= j′.
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The latter follows immediately from the fact that conditioned on J 6= J ′ (which is
equivalent to E), X,J and J ′ form a Markov chain X ↔ J ↔ J ′, and thus, given J = j,
additionally conditioning on J ′ = j′ does not change the distribution of X. For the
independence of J and J ′, consider the joint probability distribution of J and J ′, given by
PJJ ′(j, j
′) = PJ ′JE(j′, j) + PJ ′J E¯(j
′, j)
= PJ (j)Pr[E|J = j]PJ ′|JE(j′|j) + PJ(j)Pr[E¯ |J = j]PJ ′|J E¯(j′|j)
= PJ (j)Pr[E¯ |J = j′],
where the last equality follows by separately analyzing the cases j = j′ and j 6= j′. It
follows immediately that the marginal distribution of J ′ is PJ ′(j′) =
∑
j PJJ ′(j, j
′) =
Pr[E¯ |J = j′], and thus PJJ ′ = PJ · PJ ′ .
What is left to do for the case α = 0 is to deal with the case where there exists j∗
with Pr[E|J = j∗] = 0. Since ∑j∈[m]Pr[E¯ |J = j] = 1, it holds that Pr[E¯ |J = j] = 0 for
j 6= j∗. This motivates to define J ′ as J ′ := j∗ with probability 1. Note that this definition
directly implies that J ′ is independent from J . Furthermore, by the above observations:
E ⇐⇒ J 6= J ′. This concludes the case α = 0.
Next, we consider the case α > 0. The idea is to “inflate” the event E so that α
becomes 0, i.e., to define an event E ′ that contains E (meaning that E =⇒ E ′) so that∑
j∈[m]Pr[E ′|J = j] = m − 1, and to define J ′ as in the case α = 0 (but now using E ′).
Formally, we define E ′ as the disjoint union E ′ = E ∨ E◦ of E and an event E◦. The event
E◦ is defined by means of Pr[E◦|E , J = j,X = x] = 0, so that E and E◦ are indeed disjoint,
and Pr[E◦|J = j,X = x] = α/m, so that indeed∑
j∈[m]
Pr[E ′|J = j] =
∑
j∈[m]
(Pr[E|J = j] + Pr[E◦|J = j]) = (m− 1− α) + α = m− 1 .
We can now apply the analysis of the case α = 0 to conclude the existence of J ′,
independent of J , such that J 6= J ′ ⇐⇒ E ′ and thus (J 6= J ′) ∧ E¯◦ ⇐⇒ E ′ ∧ E¯◦ ⇐⇒ E .
Setting Ψ := E¯◦, it follows that
Hmin(X|J = j, J 6= J ′,Ψ) = Hmin(X|J = j, E) ≥ (δ/2 − 2ǫ)n ,
where Pr[Ψ] = 1 − Pr[E◦] = 1 − α/m ≥ 1 − (2m − 1)2−ǫn/m ≥ 1 − 2 · 2−ǫn. Finally,
using similar reasoning as in the case α = 0, it follows that the same bound holds for
Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ = j′,Ψ) whenever j 6= j′. This concludes the case α > 0.
Finally, we consider the case α < 0. The approach is the same as above, but now E ′ is
obtained by “deflating” E . Specifically, we define E ′ by means of Pr[E ′|E¯ , J = j,X = x] =
Pr[E ′|E¯ ] = 0, so that E ′ is contained in E , and Pr[E ′|E , J = j,X = x] = Pr[E ′|E ] = m−1m−1−α ,
so that ∑
j∈[m]
Pr[E ′|J = j] =
∑
j∈[m]
Pr[E ′|E ] · Pr[E|J = j] = m− 1 .
Again, from the α = 0 case we obtain J ′, independent of J , such that the event J 6= J ′ is
equivalent to the event E ′.
It follows that
Hmin(X|J = j, J 6= J ′) = Hmin(X|J = j, E ′) = Hmin(X|J = j, E ′, E)
≥ Hmin(X|J = j, E) − log(P [E ′|E , J = j]) ≥ (δ/2 − 2ǫ)n − 1 ,
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where the second equality holds because E ′ =⇒ E , the first inequality holds because
additionally conditioning on E ′ increases the probabilities of X conditioned on J = j and
E by at most a factor 1/P [E ′|E , J = j]), and the last inequality holds by Corollary 8)
and because P [E ′|E , J = j]) = m−1m−1−α ≥ 12 , where the latter holds since α ≥ −1. Finally,
using similar reasoning as in the previous cases, it follows that the same bound holds for
Hmin(X|J = j, J ′ = j′) whenever j 6= j′. This concludes the proof.
3.2 Constructing Good Families of Bases
Here, we discuss some interesting choices for the family {B1, . . . ,Bm} of bases. We say
that such a family is “good” if δ = − 1n log(c2) converges to a strictly positive constant
as n tends to infinity. There are various ways to construct such families. For example,
a family obtained through sampling according to the Haar measure will be good with
overwhelming probability (a precise statement, in which “good” means δ = 0.9, can be
found at the very end of the proof of Theorem 2.5 of [FHS11]). The best possible constant
δ = 1 is achieved for a family of mutually unbiased bases. However, for arbitrary quantum
systems (i.e., not necessarily multi-qubit systems) it is not well understood how large such
a family may be, beyond that its size cannot exceed the dimension plus 1.
In the upcoming section, we will use the following simple and well-known construction.
For an arbitrary binary code C ⊂ {+,×}n of size m, minimum distance d and encoding
function c : [m] → C, we can construct a family {B1, . . . ,Bm} of bases as follows. We
identify the jth codeword, i.e. c(j) = (c1, . . . , cn) for j ∈ [m], with the basis Bj = {|x〉c(j) :
x ∈ {0, 1}n} = {(Hc1⊗· · ·⊗Hcn)|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n}. In other words, Bj measures qubit-wise
in the computational or the Hadamard basis, depending on the corresponding coordinate
of c(j). It is easy to see that the maximum overlap c of the family obtained this way
is directly related to the minimum distance of C, namely δ = − 1n log(c2) coincides with
the relative minimal distance d/n of C. Hence, choosing an asymptotically good code
immediately yields a good family of bases.
4 Application: A New Quantum Identification Scheme
Our main application of the new uncertainty relation is in proving security of a new
identification scheme in the quantum setting. The goal of (password-based) identification
is to “prove” knowledge of a password w (or some other low-entropy key, like a PIN)
without giving w away. More formally, given a user U and a server S that hold a pre-
agreed password w ∈ W, U wants to convince S that he indeed knows w, but in such
a way that he gives away as little information on w as possible in case he is actually
interacting with a dishonest server S∗.
In [DFSS07], Damg˚ard et al. showed the existence of a secure identification scheme in
the bounded-quantum-storage model. The scheme involves the communication of qubits,
and is secure against an arbitrary dishonest server S that has limited quantum storage
capabilities and can only store a certain fraction of the communicated qubits, whereas the
security against a dishonest user U∗ holds unconditionally.
On the negative side, it is known that without any restriction on (one of) the dishonest
participants, secure identification is impossible (even in the quantum setting). Indeed, if
a quantum scheme is unconditionally secure against a dishonest user, then unavoidably
it can be broken by a dishonest server with unbounded quantum-storage and unbounded
quantum-computing power; this follows essentially from [Lo97] (see also [DFSS07]). Thus,
15
the best one can hope for (for a scheme that is unconditionally secure against a dishonest
user) is that in order to break it, unbounded quantum storage and unbounded quantum-
computing power is necessary for the dishonest server. This is not the case for the scheme
of [DFSS07]: storing all the communicated qubits as they are, and measuring them qubit-
wise in one or the other basis at the end, completely breaks the scheme. Thus, no quantum
computing power at all is necessary to break the scheme, only sufficient quantum storage.
In this section, we propose a new identification scheme, which can be regarded as a
first step towards closing the above gap. Like the scheme from [DFSS07], our new scheme
is secure against an unbounded dishonest user and against a dishonest server with limited
quantum storage capabilities. The new uncertainty relation forms the main ingredient
in the user-security proof in the BQSM. Furthermore, and in contrast to [DFSS07], a
minimal amount of quantum computation power is necessary to break the scheme, beyond
sufficient quantum storage. Indeed, next to the security against a dishonest server with
bounded quantum storage, we also prove—in Section 5—security against a dishonest server
that can store all the communicated qubits, but is restricted to measure them qubit-wise
(in arbitrary qubit bases) at the end of the protocol execution. Thus, beyond sufficient
quantum storage, quantum computation that involves pairs of qubits is necessary (and in
fact sufficient) to break the new scheme.
Restricting the dishonest server to qubit-wise measurements may look restrictive; how-
ever, we stress that in order to break the scheme, the dishonest server needs to store
many qubits and perform quantum operations on them that go beyond single-qubit oper-
ations; this may indeed be considerably more challenging than storing many qubits and
measuring them qubit-wise. Furthermore, it turns out that proving security against such
a dishonest server that is restricted to qubit-wise measurements is already challenging;
indeed, standard techniques do not seem applicable here. Therefore, handling a dishonest
server that can, say, act on blocks of qubits, must be left to future research.
4.1 Security Definitions
We first formalize the security properties we want to achieve. We borrow the definitions
from [DFSS07], which are argued to be “the right ones” in [FS09].
Definition 10 (Correctness). An identification protocol is said to be ε-correct if, after
an execution by honest U and honest S, S accepts with probability 1− ε.
Definition 11 (User security). An identification protocol for two parties U, S is ε-secure
for the user U against (dishonest) server S∗ if the following holds: If the initial state of S∗
is independent of W , then its state E after execution of the protocol is such that there
exists a random variable W ′ that is independent of W and such that
ρWW ′E|W 6=W ′ ≈ε ρW↔W ′↔E|W 6=W ′.
Definition 12 (Server security). An identification protocol for two parties U, S is ε-secure
for the server S against (dishonest) user U∗ if the following holds: whenever the initial
state of U∗ is independent of W , then there exists a random variable W ′ (possibly ⊥)
that is independent of W such that if W 6= W ′ then S accepts with probability at most
ε. Furthermore, the common state ρWE after execution of the protocol (including S’s
announcement to accept or reject) satisfies
ρWW ′E|W 6=W ′ ≈ε ρW↔W ′↔E|W 6=W ′.
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We will prove the user-security of the protocol in two different models, in which dif-
ferent assumptions are made. Because these assumptions are in some sense “orthogonal”,
the hope is that if security would break down in one model to a failing assumption, the
protocol is still secure by the other model.
4.2 Description of the New Quantum Identification
Scheme
Let C ⊂ {+,×}n be a binary code with minimum distance d, and let c : W → C be its
encoding function. Let m := |W|, and typically, m < 2n. Let F be the class of all linear
functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ < n, represented as ℓ× n binary matrices. It is
well-known that this class is two-universal. Furthermore, let G be a strongly two-universal
class of hash functions from W to {0, 1}ℓ. Protocol Q-ID is shown below.
Protocol Q-ID
1. U picks x ∈ {0, 1}n independently and uniformly at random and sends |x〉
c(w) to S.
2. S measures in basis c(w). Let x′ be the outcome.
3. U picks f ∈ F independently and uniformly at random and sends it to S
4. S picks g ∈ G independently and uniformly at random and sends it to U
5. U computes and sends z := f(x)⊕ g(w) to S
6. S accepts if and only if z = z′ where z′ := f(x′)⊕ g(w)
Our scheme is quite similar to the scheme in [DFSS07]. The difference is that in our
scheme, both parties, U and S, use c(w) as basis for preparing/measuring the qubits in step
(1) and (2), whereas in [DFSS07], only S uses c(w) and U uses a random basis θ ∈ {+,×}n
instead, and then U communicates θ to S and all the positions where θ and c(w) differ are
dismissed. Thus, in some sense, our new scheme is more natural since why should U use
a random basis when he knows the right basis (i.e., the one that S uses)? In [DFSS07],
using a random basis (for U) was crucial for their proof technique, which is based on an
entropic uncertainty relation of a certain form, which asks for a random basis. However,
using a random basis, which then needs to be announced, renders the scheme insecure
against a dishonest server S∗ that is capable of storing all the communicated qubits and
then measure them in the right basis once it has been announced. Our new uncertainty
relation applies to the case where an n-qubit state is measured in a basis that is sampled
from a code C, and thus is applicable to the new scheme where U uses basis c(w) ∈ C.
Since this basis is common knowledge (to the honest participants), it does not have to
be communicated, and as such a straightforward store-and-then-measure attack as above
does not apply.
A downside of our scheme is that security only holds in case of a perfect quantum
source, which emits exactly one qubit when triggered. Indeed, a multi-photon emission
enables a dishonest server S∗ to learn information on the basis used, and thus gives away
information on the password w in our scheme. As such, our scheme is currently mainly of
theoretical interest.
It is straightforward to verify that (in the ideal setting with perfect sources, no noise,
etc.) Q-ID satisfies the correctness property (Definition 10) perfectly, i.e. ε = 0. In the
remaining sections, we prove (unconditional) security against a dishonest user, and we
prove security against two kinds of restricted dishonest servers. First, against a dishonest
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server that has limited quantum storage capabilities, and then against a dishonest server
that can store an unbounded number of qubits, but can only store and measure them
qubit-wise.
4.3 (Unconditional) Server Security
First, we claim security of Q-ID against an arbitrary dishonest user U∗ (that is merely
restricted by the laws of quantum mechanics).
Theorem 13. Q-ID is ε-secure for the server with ε =
(m
2
)
2−ℓ.
Proof. Clearly, from the steps (1) to (5) in the protocol Q-ID, U∗ learns no information
on W at all. The only information he may learn is by observing whether S accepts or not
in step (6). Therefore, in order to prove server security, it suffices to show the existence
of a random variable W ′, independent of W , with the property that S rejects whenever
W ′ 6=W (except with probability 12m(m− 1)2−ℓ).
We may assume that W = {1, . . . ,m}. Let ρWX′FGZE be the state describing the
password W , the variables X ′, F,G and Z occurring in the protocol from the server’s
point of view, and U∗’s quantum state E before observing S’s decision to accept or reject.
For any w ∈ W, consider the state ρwX′FGZE := ρX′FGZE|W=w. Note that the reduced
state ρwFGZE is the same for any w ∈ W; this follows from the assumption that U∗’s initial
state is independent of W and because F,G and Z are produced independently of W . We
may thus write ρwX′FGZE as ρX′wFGZE, and we can “glue together” the states ρX′wFGZE for
all choices of w. This means, there exists a state ρX′
1
···X′mFGZE1···Em that correctly reduces
to ρX′wFGZEw = ρX′wFGZE for any w ∈ W, and conditioned on FGZ, we have that X ′iEi
is independent of X ′jEj for any i 6= j ∈ W. It is easy to see that for any i 6= j ∈ W, G is
independent of X ′i,X
′
j and F . Therefore, by the strong two-universality of G, for any i 6= j
it holds that Z ′i 6= Z ′j except with probability 2−ℓ, where Z ′w = FX ′w + G(w) for any w.
Therefore, by the union bound, Z ′1, . . . , Z
′
m are pairwise distinct and thus Z can coincide
with at most one of the Z ′w’s, except with probability ε =
1
2m(m−1)2−ℓ. LetW ′ be defined
such that Z = Z ′W ′ ; if there is no such Z
′
w then we let W
′ =⊥, and if there are more than
one then we let it be the first. Recall, the latter can happen with probability at most ε.
We now extend the state ρX′
1
···X′mFGZW ′E1···Em by W , chosen independently according to
PW . Clearly W
′ is independent of W . Furthermore, except with probability at most ε, if
W 6= W ′ then Z 6= Z ′W . Finally note that ρX′WFGZW ′WEW is such that ρX′WFGZWEW =∑
w PW (w)ρX′wFGZEw ⊗ |w〉〈w| =
∑
w PW (w)ρ
w
X′FGZE ⊗ |w〉〈w| = ρX′FGZWE. Thus, also
with respect to the state ρX′FGZWE there exist W
′, independent of W , such that if
W ′ 6=W then Z 6= Z ′ except with probability at most ε. This was to be shown.
4.4 User Security in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model
Next, we consider a dishonest server S∗, and first prove security of Q-ID in the bounded-
quantum-storage model. In this model, as introduced in [DFSS05], it is assumed that the
adversary (here S∗) cannot store more than a fixed number of qubits, say q. The security
proof of Q-ID in the bounded-quantum-storage model is very similar to the corresponding
proof in [DFSS07] for their scheme, except that we use the new uncertainty relation from
Section 3. Furthermore, since our uncertainty relation (Theorem 9) already guarantees
the existence of the random variable W ′ as required by the security property, no entropy-
splitting as in [DFSS07] is needed.
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In the following, let δ := d/n, i.e. the relative minimum distance of C.
Theorem 14. Let S∗ be a dishonest server whose quantum memory is at most q qubits
at step 3 of Q-ID. Then, for any 0 < κ < δ/4, Q-ID is ε-secure for the user with
ε = 2−
1
2
((δ/2−2κ)n−1−q−ℓ) + 4 · 2−κn.
Proof. We consider and analyze a purified version of Q-ID where in step (1) instead of
sending |X〉c to S∗ for a uniformly distributed X, U prepares a fully entangled state
2−n/2
∑
x |x〉|x〉 and sends the second register to S∗ while keeping the first. Then, in step
(3) when the memory bound has applied, U measures his register in the basis c(W ) in
order to obtain X. Note that this procedure produces exactly the same common state
as in the original (non-purified) version of Q-ID. Thus, we may just as well analyze this
purified version.
The state of S∗ consists of his initial state and his part of the EPR pairs, and may
include an additional ancilla register. Before the memory bound applies, S∗ may perform
any unitary transformation on his composite system. When the memory bound is applied
(just before step (3) is executed in Q-ID), S∗ has to measure all but q qubits of his system.
Let the classical outcome of this measurement be denoted by y, and let E′ be the remaining
quantum state of at most q qubits. The common state has collapsed to a (n + q)-qubit
state and depends on y; the analysis below holds for any y. Next, U measures his n-
qubit part of the common state in basis c(W ); let X denote the classical outcome of this
measurement. By our new uncertainty relation (Theorem 9) and subsequently applying
the min-entropy chain rule that is given in Lemma 5 (to take the q stored qubits into
account) it follows that there exists W ′, independent of W , and an event Ψ that occurs
at least with probability 1− 2 · 2−κn, such that
Hmin(X|E′,W = w,W ′ = w′,Ψ) ≥ (δ/2 − 2κ)n − 1− q.
for any w,w′ such that w 6= w′. Because U chooses F independently at random from a
2-universal family, privacy amplification guarantees that
dunif(F (X)|E′F,W = w,W ′ = w′) ≤ ε′ := 1
2
· 2− 12 ((δ/2−2κ)n−1−q−ℓ) + 2 · 2−κn,
for any w,w′ such that w 6= w′. Recall that Z = F (X) ⊕ G(W ). By security of the
one-time pad it follows that
dunif(Z|E′FG,W = w,W ′ = w′) ≤ ε′, (2)
for any w,w′ such that w 6= w′. To prove the claim, we need to bound,
δ(ρWW ′E|W 6=W ′, ρW↔W ′↔E|W 6=W ′)
= 12‖ρWW ′E′FGZ|W 6=W ′ − ρW↔W ′↔E′FGZ|W 6=W ′‖1
≤ 12‖ρWW ′E′FGZ|W 6=W ′ − ρWW ′E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI‖1
+ 12‖ρWW ′E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI− ρW↔W ′↔E′FGZ|W 6=W ′‖1 (3)
where the equality follows by definition of trace distance (Definition 3) and the fact that
the output state E is obtained by applying a unitary transformation to the set of registers
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(E′, F , G, W ′, Z). The inequality is the triangle inequality; in the remainder of the proof,
we will show that both terms in (3) are upper bounded by ε′.
1
2‖ρWW ′E′FGZ|W 6=W ′ − ρWW ′E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI‖1
=
∑
w 6=w′
PWW ′|W 6=W ′(w,w′) dunif(Z|E′FG,W = w,W ′ = w′) ≤ ε′,
where the latter inequality follows from (2).For the other term, we reason as follows:
1
2‖ρWW ′E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI− ρW↔W ′↔E′FGZ|W 6=W ′‖1
= 12
∑
w 6=w′
PWW ′|W 6=W ′(w,w′) ‖ρw,w
′
E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI− ρw
′
E′FGZ|W 6=W ′‖1
= 12
∑
w 6=w′
PWW ′|W 6=W ′(w,w′) ‖ρw,w
′
E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI
−
∑
w′′
s.t. w′′ 6=w′
PW |W ′,W 6=W ′(w′′|w′)ρw
′′,w′
E′FGZ|W 6=W ′‖1
= 12
∑
w′
PW ′|W 6=W ′(w′) ‖
∑
w
s.t. w 6=w′
PW |W ′,W 6=W ′(w|w′)ρw,w
′
E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI
−
∑
w′′
s.t. w′′ 6=w′
PW |W ′,W 6=W ′(w′′|w′)ρw
′′,w′
E′FGZ|W 6=W ′
∑
w
s.t. w 6=w′
PW |W ′,W 6=W ′(w|w′)‖1
= 12
∑
w 6=w′
PWW ′|W 6=W ′(w,w′) ‖ρw,w
′
E′FG|W 6=W ′ ⊗ 2−ℓI− ρw,w
′
E′FGZ|W 6=W ′‖1
=
∑
w 6=w′
PWW ′|W 6=W ′(w,w′) dunif(Z|E′FG,W = w,W ′ = w′) ≤ ε′,
where the first equality follows by definition of conditional independence and by a basic
property of the trace distance; the third and fourth equality follow by linearity of the trace
distance. The inequality on the last line follows from (2). This proves the claim.
5 User Security in the Single-Qubit-Operations Model
We now consider a dishonest server S∗ that can store an unbounded number of qubits.
Clearly, against such a S∗, Theorem 14 provides no security guarantee anymore. We
show here that there is still some level of security left. Specifically, we show that Q-ID
is still secure against a dishonest server S∗ that can reliably store all the communicated
qubits and measure them qubit-wise and non-adaptively at the end of the protocol. This
feature distinguishes our identification protocol from the protocol from [DFSS07], which
completely breaks down against such an attack.
5.1 The Model
Formally, a dishonest server S∗ in the SQOM is modeled as follows.
1. S∗ may reliably store the n-qubit state |x〉
c(w) = |x1〉c(w)1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉c(w)n received
in step (1) of Q-ID.
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2. At the end of the protocol, in step (5), S∗ chooses an arbitrary sequence θ =
(θ1, . . . , θn), where each θi describes an arbitrary orthonormal basis of C
2, and mea-
sures each qubit |xi〉c(w)i in basis θi to observe Yi ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, we assume that
S∗ measures all qubits at the end of the protocol.
3. The choice of θ may depend on all the classical information gathered during the
execution of the protocol, but we assume a non-adaptive setting where θi does not
depend on Yj for i 6= j, i.e., S∗ has to choose θ entirely before performing any
measurement.
Considering complete projective measurements acting on individual qubits, rather than
general single-qubit POVMs, may be considered a restriction of our model. Nonetheless,
general POVM measurements can always be described by projective measurements on a
bigger system. In this sense, restricting to projective measurements is consistent with the
requirement of single-qubit operations. It seems non-trivial to extend our security proof
to general single-qubit POVMs.
The restriction to non-adaptive measurements (item 3) is rather strong, even though
the protocol from [DFSS07] already breaks down in this non-adaptive setting. The restric-
tion was introduced as a stepping stone towards proving the adaptive case. Up to now,
we have unfortunately not yet succeeded in doing so, hence we leave the adaptive case for
future research.
We also leave for future research the case of a less restricted dishonest server S∗ that
can do measurements on blocks that are less stringently bounded in size. Whereas the
adaptive versus non-adaptive issue appears to be a proof-technical problem (Q-ID looks
secure also against an adaptive S∗), allowing measurements on larger blocks will require
a new protocol, since Q-ID becomes insecure when S∗ can do measurements on blocks of
size 2, as we show in Section 5.5.
5.2 No Privacy Amplification
One might expect that proving security of Q-ID in the SQOM, i.e., against a dishonest
server S∗ that is restricted to single-qubit operations should be straightforward, but actu-
ally the opposite is true, for the following reason. Even though it is not hard to show that
after his measurements, S∗ has lower bounded uncertainty in x (except if he was able to
guess w), it is not clear how to conclude that f(x) is close to random so that z does not
reveal a significant amount of information about w. The reason is that standard privacy
amplification fails to apply here. Indeed, the model allows S∗ to postpone the measure-
ment of all qubits to step (5) of the protocol. The hash function f , however, is chosen
and sent already in step (3). This means that S∗ can choose his measurements in step
(5) depending on f . As a consequence, the distribution of x from the point of view of S∗
may depend on the choice of the hash function f , in which case the privacy-amplification
theorem does not give any guarantees.
5.3 Single-Qubit Measurements
Consider an arbitrary sequence θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) where each θi describes an orthonormal
basis of C2. Let |ψ〉 be an n-qubit system of the form
|ψ〉 = |x〉b = Hb1 |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hbn |xn〉,
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where x and b are arbitrary in {0, 1}n. Measuring |ψ〉 qubit-wise in basis θ results in a
measurement outcome Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ {0, 1}n. Suppose that x, b and θ are in fact
realizations of the random variables X, B and Θ respectively. It follows immediately from
the product structure of the state |ψ〉 that
PY |XBΘ(y|x, b, θ) =
n∏
i=0
PYi|XiBiΘi(yi|xi, bi, θi),
i.e. the random variables Yi are statistically independent conditioned on arbitrary fixed
values for Xi, Bi and Θi but such that PXiBiΘi(xi, bi, θi) > 0.
Lemma 15. The distribution PYi|XiBiΘi(yi|xi, bi, θi) exhibits the following symmetries:
PYi|XiBiΘi(0|0, bi, θi) = PYi|XiBiΘi(1|1, bi, θi)
and
PYi|XiBiΘi(0|1, bi, θi) = PYi|XiBiΘi(1|0, bi, θi)
for all i ∈ [n], for all bi and θi with PXiBiΘi(ξ, bi, θi) > 0 for all ξ ∈ {0, 1}.
The proof can found in Appendix C. The symmetry characterized in Lemma 15 coin-
cides with that of the binary symmetric channel, i.e. we can view Y as a “noisy version”
of X, where this noise—produced by the measurement—is independent of X.
Formally, we can write Y as
Y = X ⊕∆, (4)
where the random variable ∆ = (∆1, . . . ,∆n) ∈ {0, 1}n thus represents the error between
the random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n that is “encoded” in the quantum state and the mea-
surement outcome Y ∈ {0, 1}n. By substituting (4) in Lemma 15, we get the following
corollary.
Corollary 16 (Independence Between ∆ and X). For every i ∈ [n] it holds that
P∆i|XiBiΘi(δi|xi, bi, θi) = P∆i|BiΘi(δi|bi, θi)
for all δi ∈ {0, 1} and for all xi, bi and θi such that PXiBiΘi(xi, bi, θi) > 0.
Furthermore, since the random variables Yi are statistically independent conditioned
on fixed values for Xi, Bi and Θi, it follows that the ∆i are statistically independent
conditioned on fixed values for Bi and Θi.
Definition 17 (Quantized Basis). For any orthonormal basis θi = {|v1〉, |v2〉} on C2, we
define the quantized basis of θi as
θˆi := j
∗ ∈ {0, 1}, where j∗ ∈ argmax
j∈{0,1}
max
k∈{1,2}
|〈vk|Hj|0〉|.
If both j ∈ {0, 1} attain the maximum, then j∗ is chosen arbitrarily. The quantized basis
of the sequence θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) is naturally defined as the element-wise application of the
above, resulting in θˆ ∈ {0, 1}n.
We will use the bias as a measure for the predictability of ∆i.
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Theorem 18. When measuring the qubit Hbi |xi〉 for any xi, bi ∈ {0, 1} in any orthonor-
mal basis θi on C
2 for which the quantized basis θˆi is the complement of bi, i.e. θˆi = bi⊕1,
then the bias of ∆i ∈ {0, 1}, where ∆i = Yi ⊕ xi and Yi ∈ {0, 1} is the measurement
outcome, is upper bounded by
bias(∆i) ≤ 1√
2
.
Since the theorem holds for any xi ∈ {0, 1} and since Corollary 16 guarantees that ∆i
is independent from an arbitrary random variable Xi, the theorem also applies when we
replace xi by the random variable Xi.
In order to prove Theorem 18, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 19. If, for any orthonormal basis θi on C
2, there exists a bit bi ∈ {0, 1} so that
when measuring the qubit Hbi |xi〉 for any xi ∈ {0, 1} in the basis θi to obtain Zi ∈ {0, 1}
it holds that
bias(Zi) ≥ 1/
√
2,
then it holds that when measuring the qubit Hbi⊕1|xi〉 in the basis θi to obtain Yi ∈ {0, 1},
bias(Yi) ≤ 1/
√
2.
Proof. First note that for any xi, bi ∈ {0, 1} and any orthonormal basis θi on C2, measuring
a state Hbi |xi〉 in θi = {|v〉, |w〉} where |v〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 and |w〉 = β|0〉 − α|1〉 gives the
same outcome distribution (up to permutations) as when measuring one of the basis states
of θi (when viewed as a quantum state), say |w〉, using the basis {Hbi |xi〉,Hbi |xi ⊕ 1〉}.
To see why this holds, note that it follows immediately that |〈w|Hbi |xi〉|2 = |〈xi|Hbi |w〉|2.
Furthermore, we have already shown in the proof of Lemma 15 that
|〈v|Hbi |xi〉|2 = |〈w|Hbi |xi ⊕ 1〉|2
holds.
Hence, we can apply Theorem 7 with ρ = |w〉〈w| (this implies that n = 1), m = 2
and B0 and B1 are the computational and Hadamard basis respectively. The maximum
overlap between those bases is c = 1/
√
2. Theorem 7 gives us that
p{|0〉,|1〉}max + p
{|+〉,|−〉}
max ≤ 1 +
1√
2
,
where p
{|0〉,|1〉}
max and p
{|+〉,|−〉}
max respectively denote the maximum probability in the distri-
bution obtained by measuring in the computational and Hadamard basis. By simple
manipulations we can write this as a bound on the sum of the biases:
2√
2
≥ (2p{|0〉,|1〉}max − 1) + (2p{|+〉,|−〉}max − 1)
= bias(Yi) + bias(Zi). (5)
From this relation, the claim follows immediately.
Following [Sch07], we want to remark that both biases in (5) are equal to 1/
√
2 when θi
is the Breidbart basis, which is the basis that is precisely “in between” the computational
and the Hadamard basis:8
|v〉 = cos(π8 )|0〉+ sin(π8 )|1〉 and |w〉 = sin(π8 )|0〉 − cos(π8 )|1〉.
8In [Sch07], the corresponding state is called the “Hadamard-invariant state.”
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Proof of Theorem 18 . Let θi = {|v0〉, |v1〉}. We will make a case distinction based on the
value of
µ := max
k∈{0,1}
|〈vk|H θˆi |0〉|. (6)
If µ ≤ cos(π/8), then we also have that maxk∈{0,1} |〈vk|Hbi |xi〉| ≤ cos(π/8) where bi =
θˆi⊕1, this holds by definition of the quantized basis (Definition 17). Then, the probability
of obtaining outcome Yi = k
∗, where k∗ ∈ {0, 1} achieves the maximum in (6), is bounded
by
PYi(k
∗) = |〈vk∗ |Hbi |xi〉|2 ≤ cos2(π/8) = 12 + 12√2 .
Hence,
bias(∆i) = bias(Yi) = |PYi(k∗)− (1 − PYi(k∗))| = |2PYi(k∗)− 1| ≤ 1√2 .
If µ > cos(π/8), then when measuring the state H θˆi |xi〉 in θi to obtain Zi ∈ {0, 1}, we
have that bias(Zi) > 1/
√
2 (this follows from similar computations as performed above).
We now invoke Lemma 19 to conclude that when measuring the state Hbi |xi〉 in θi to
obtain Yi, bias(∆i) = bias(Yi) <
1√
2
.
5.4 User Security of Q-ID
We are now ready to state and prove the security of Q-ID against a dishonest user in the
SQOM.
Theorem 20 (User Security). Let S∗ be a dishonest server with unbounded quantum
storage that is restricted to non-adaptive single-qubit operations, as specified in Section 5.1.
Then, for any 0 < β < 14 , user security (as defined in Definition 11) holds with
ε ≤ 122
1
2
ℓ− 1
4
( 1
4
−β)d +
(
m
2
)
22ℓ exp(−2dβ2)
Note that d is typically linear in n whereas ℓ is chosen independently of n, hence the
expression above is negligible in d.
To prove Theorem 20 we need the following technical lemma and corollary. Recall that
F denotes the class of all linear functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ < n, represented
as binary ℓ× n matrices.
Lemma 21. Let n, k and ℓ be arbitrary positive integers, let 0 < β < 14 and let I ⊂ [n]
such that |I| ≥ k, and let F be uniform over F = {0, 1}ℓ×n. Then, it holds except with
probability 22ℓ exp(−2kβ2) (the probability is over the random matrix F ) that∣∣(f ⊙ g)I ∣∣ > (14 − β)k ∀f, g ∈ span(F ) \ {0n}
Proof. Without loss of generality, we will assume that |I| = k. Now take arbitrary but
non-zero vectors r, s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and let V := rF and W := sF . We will analyze the case
r 6= s; the case r = s is similar but simpler. Because each element of F is an independent
random bit, and r and s are non-zero and r 6= s, V and W are independent and uniformly
distributed n-bit vectors with expected relative Hamming weight 1/2. Hence, on average
|(V ⊙W )I | equals k/4. Furthermore, using Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 2), we may
conclude that
Pr
[
k
4
− |(V ⊙W )I | > βk
]
= Pr
[
|(V ⊙W )I | <
(
1
4 − β
)
k
]
≤ exp(−2kβ2) .
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Finally, the claim follows by applying the union bound over the choice of r and s (each 2ℓ
possibilities).
Recall that C is a binary code with minimum distance d, c(·) its encoding function,
and that m := |W|.
Corollary 22. Let 0 < β < 14 , and let F be uniformly distributed over F . Then, F has the
following property except with probability
(m
2
)
22ℓ exp(−2dβ2): for any string s ∈ {0, 1}n
(possibly depending on the choice of F ), there exists at most one c˜ ∈ C such that for any
code word c ∈ C different from c˜, it holds that
|f ⊙ (c⊕ s)| ≥ 12 (14 − β)d ∀f ∈ span(F ) \ {0n}
We prove the statement by arguing for two c˜’s and showing that they must be identical.
In the proof, we will make use of the two following propositions.
Proposition 23. |a| ≥ |a⊙ b| for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}n.
Proof. Follows immediately.
Proposition 24. |a⊙ b|+ |a⊙ c| ≥ |a⊙ (b⊕ c)| for all a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}n.
Proof. |a ⊙ (b ⊕ c)| = |a ⊙ b ⊕ a ⊙ c| ≤ |a ⊙ b| + |a ⊙ c|, where the equality is the
distributivity of the Schur product, and the inequality is the triangle inequality for the
Hamming weight.
Proof of Corollary 22. By Lemma 21 with I := {i ∈ [n] : ci 6= c′i} for c, c′ ∈ C, and
by applying the union bound over all possible pairs (c, c′), we obtain that except with
probability
(m
2
)
22ℓ exp(−2dβ2) (over the choice of F ), it holds that
|f ⊙ g ⊙ (c⊕ c′)| > (14 − β)d (7)
for all f, g ∈ span(F ) \ {0n} and all c, c′ ∈ C with c 6= c′.
Now, for such an F , and for every choice of s ∈ {0, 1}n, consider c˜1, c˜2 ∈ C and
f1, f2 ∈ span(F ) \ {0n} such that
|f1 ⊙ (c˜1 ⊕ s)| < 12(14 − β)d and |f2 ⊙ (c˜2 ⊕ s)| < 12(14 − β)d.
We will show that this implies c˜1 = c˜2, which proves the claim. Indeed, we can write
(14 − β)d > |f1 ⊙ (c˜1 ⊕ s)|+ |f2 ⊙ (c˜2 ⊕ s)|
≥ |f1 ⊙ f2 ⊙ (c˜1 ⊕ s)|+ |f1 ⊙ f2 ⊙ (c˜2 ⊕ s)| ≥ |f1 ⊙ f2 ⊙ (c˜1⊕c˜2)|
where the second inequality is Proposition 23 applied twice and the third inequality is
Proposition 24. This contradicts (7) unless c˜1 = c˜2.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 20. In the proof, when F ∈ F acts on an n-bit
vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, we prefer the notation F (x) over matrix-product notation Fx.9
9When using matrix-product notation ambiguities could arise, e.g. in subscripts of probability distribu-
tions like PFX : then it is not clear whether this means the joint distribution of F and X or the distribution
of F acting on X?
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Proof of Theorem 20. Consider an execution of Q-ID, with a dishonest server S∗ as de-
scribed in Section 5.1. We let W,X and Z be the random variables that describe the
values w, x and z occurring in the protocol.
From Q-ID’s description, we see that F is uniform over F . Hence, by Corollary 22
it will be “good” (in the sense that the bound from Corollary 22 holds) except with
probability
(
m
2
)
22ℓ exp(−2dβ2). From here, we consider a fixed choice for F and condition
on the event that it is “good,” we thus book-keep the probability that F is “bad” and
take it into account at the end of the analysis. Although we have fixed F , we will keep
using capital notation for it, to emphasize that F is a matrix. We also fix G = g for an
arbitrary g; the analysis below holds for any such choice.
Let Θ describe the qubit-wise measurement performed by S∗ at the end of the execution,
and Y the corresponding measurement outcome. By the non-adaptivity restriction and by
the requirement in Definition 11 that S∗ is initially independent of W , we may conclude
that, once G and F are fixed, Θ is a function of Z. (Recall that Z = F (X)⊕ g(W ).)
We will defineW ′ with the help of Corollary 22. Let Θˆ be the quantized basis of Θ, as
defined in Definition 17. Given a fixed value θ for Θ, and thus a fixed value θˆ for Θˆ, we set
s, which is a variable that occurs in Corollary 22, to s = θˆ. Corollary 22 now guarantees
that there exists at most one c˜. If c˜ indeed exists, then we choose w′ such that c(w′) = c˜.
Otherwise, we pick w′ ∈ W arbitrarily (any choice will do). Note that this defines the
random variableW ′, and furthermore note that Z → Θ→ Θˆ→W ′ forms a Markov chain.
Moreover, by the choice of w′ it immediately follows from Corollary 22 that for all w 6= w′
and for all f ∈ span(F ) \ {0n} it holds that∣∣f ⊙ (c(w) ⊕ θˆ)∣∣ ≥ 12(14 − β)d. (8)
We will make use of this bound later in the proof.
Since the model (Section 5.1) enforces the dishonest server to measure all qubits at
the end of the protocol, the system E = (Y,Z,Θ) is classical and hence the trace-distance-
based user-security definition (Definition 11) simplifies to a bound on the statistical dis-
tance between distributions. I.e., it is sufficient to prove that
SD(PEW |W ′=w′,W ′ 6=W , PW |W ′=w′,W 6=W ′PE|W ′=w′,W 6=W ′) ≤ ε
holds for any w′. Consider the distribution that appears above as the first argument to
the statistical distance, i.e. PEW |W ′=w′,W ′ 6=W . By substituting E = (Y,Z,Θ), it factors
as follows10
PY ZΘW |W ′,W 6=W ′ = PW |W ′,W 6=W ′ PZΘ|WW ′,W 6=W ′ PY |ZΘWW ′,W 6=W ′
= PW |W ′,W 6=W ′ PZΘ|W ′,W 6=W ′ PY |F (X)ΘWW ′,W 6=W ′, (9)
where the equality PZΘ|WW ′,W 6=W ′ = PZΘ|W ′,W 6=W ′ holds by the following argument: Z
is independent of W (since F (X) acts as one-time pad) and Z → Θ → W ′ is a Markov
chain, and S∗ (who computes Θ from Z) is initially independent of W by Definition 11,
hence W is independent of Z, Θ and W ′, which implies the above equality. The equality
PY |ZΘWW ′,W 6=W ′ = PY |F (X)ΘWW ′,W 6=W ′ holds by the observation that given W , Z is
uniquely determined by F (X) and vice versa.
In the remainder of this proof we will show that
dunif(Y |F (X) = u,Θ = v,W = w,W ′ = w′) ≤ 122
ℓ
2
− 1
4
( 1
4
−β)d,
10Note that we shorten notation here by omitting the parentheses containing the function arguments.
The quantification is over all inputs for which all involved conditional probabilities are well-defined.
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for all u, v, w such that w 6= w′, where w′ is determined by v. This then implies that the
rightmost factor in (9) is essentially independent of W , and concludes the proof.
To simplify notation, we define E to be the event
E := {F (X) = u,Θ = v,W = w,W ′ = w′}
for fixed but arbitrary choices u, v and w such that w 6= w′, where w′ is determined by v.
We show closeness to the uniform distribution by using the XOR inequality from Diaconis
et al. (Theorem 1), i.e., we use the inequality
dunif(Y |E) ≤ 12
[∑
α
bias(α · Y |E)2
] 1
2
,
where the sum is over all α in {0, 1}n \ {0n}. We split this sum into two parts, one for
α ∈ span(F ) and one for α not in span(F ), and analyze the two parts separately.
Since X is uniformly distributed, it follows that for any α /∈ span(F ), it holds that
Pα·X|F (X)(·|u) = 12 (for any u). We conclude that
1
2 = Pα·X|F (X) = Pα·X|F (X)W = Pα·X|F (X)ΘWW ′
= Pα·Y |F (X)ΘWW ′ = Pα·Y |E ∀α /∈ span(F ).
The second equality follows since W is independent of X. The third equality holds by
the fact that Θ is computed from F (X)⊕ g(W ) and W ′ is determined by Θ. The fourth
equality follows by the security of the one-time pad, i.e. recall that Y = X ⊕∆, where
by Corollary 16 it holds that ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n is independent of X when conditioned on fixed
values for B = c(W ) and Θ. Hence, it follows that bias(α · Y |E) = 0 for α /∈ span(F ).
For any non-zero α ∈ span(F ), we can write
bias(α · Y |E) = bias(α · (X ⊕∆)|E)
= bias(α ·X ⊕ α ·∆|E) (distributivity of dot product)
= bias(α ·X|E)bias(α ·∆|E) (Corollary 16)
≤ bias(α ·∆|E) (bias(α ·X) ≤ 1)
=
∏
i∈[n]
bias(αi ·∆i|E) (∆i independent)
=
∏
i∈[n]:αi=1
bias(∆i|E)
≤
∏
i∈[n]:αi=1
θˆi=c(w)i⊕1
2−
1
2 (Theorem 18)
= 2−
1
2
|α⊙(c(w)⊕θˆ)| ≤ 2− 14 ( 14−β)d (by (8))
Combining the two parts, we get
dunif(Y |E) ≤ 12
[∑
α
bias(α · Y |E)2
] 1
2
= 12
[ ∑
α∈span(F )\{0n}
bias(α · Y |E)2 + 0
] 1
2 ≤ 122
ℓ
2
− 1
4
( 1
4
−β)d .
Incorporating the error probability of having a “bad” F completes the proof.
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5.5 Attack against Q-ID with Operations on Pairs of Qubits
We present an attack with which the dishonest server S∗ can discard two passwords in one
execution of Q-ID using coherent operations on pairs of qubits.
Before discussing this attack, we first explain a straightforward strategy by which
S∗ can discard one password per execution: S∗ chooses a candidate password wˆ and
measures the state Hc(W )|X〉 qubit-wise in the basis c(wˆ) to obtain Y . S∗ then computes
F (Y ) ⊕ g(wˆ) and compares this to Z = F (X) ⊕ g(W ), which he received from the user.
If indeed Z = F (Y ) ⊕ g(wˆ), then it is very likely that W = wˆ, i.e. that S∗ guessed the
password correctly.
Let us now explain the attack, which is obtained by modifying the above strategy. The
attack is based on the following observation [DFSS05]: if S∗ can perform Bell measure-
ments on qubit pairs |x1〉a|x2〉a, for a ∈ {0, 1}, then he can learn the parity of x1 ⊕ x2 for
both choices of a simultaneously. This strategy can also be adapted to determine both
parities of a pair in which the first qubit is encoded in a basis that is opposite to that of
the second qubit, i.e. by appropriately applying a Hadamard gate prior to applying the
Bell measurement.
Let the first bit of Z be equal to f · X ⊕ g(W )1,11 where f ∈ span(F ) \ {0n}. Let
wˆ1 and wˆ2 be two candidate passwords. With the trick from above, S
∗ can measure the
positions in the set
P := {i ∈ [n] : fi = 1, c(wˆ1)i = 1⊕ c(wˆ2)i}
pairwise (assuming |P| to be even) using Bell measurements, while measuring the positions
where c(wˆ1) and c(wˆ2) coincide using ordinary single-qubit measurements. This allows him
to compute both “check bits” corresponding to both passwords simultaneously, i.e. those
check bits coincide with f · Y1 ⊕ g(wˆ1)1 and f · Y2 ⊕ g(wˆ2)1, where Y1 and Y2 are the
outcomes that S∗ would have obtained if he had measured all qubits qubit-wise in either
c(wˆ1) or c(wˆ2), respectively. If both these check bits are different from the bit Z1, then S
∗
can discard both w1 and w2.
We have seen that in the worst case, the attack is capable of discarding two passwords
in one execution, and hence clearly violates the security definition. On average, however,
the attack seems to discard just one password per execution, i.e. a candidate password
cannot be discarded if its check bit is consistent with Z1, which essentially happens with
probability 1/2. This raises the question whether the security definition is unnecessarily
strong, because it seems that not being able to discard more than one password on average
would be sufficient. Apart from this, it might be possible to improve the attack, e.g.
by selecting the positions where to measure pairwise in a more clever way, as to obtain
multiple check bits (corresponding to multiple fs in the span of F ) per candidate password,
thereby increasing the probability of discarding a wrong candidate password.
6 Conclusion
We view our work related to Q-ID as a first step in a promising line of research, aimed
at achieving security in multiple models simultaneously. The main open problem in the
context of the SQOM is to reprove our results in a more general model in which the
dishonest server S∗ can choose his basis adaptively. Also, it would be interesting to see
11By g(W )1 we mean the first bit of g(W ).
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whether similar results can be obtained in a model where the adversary is restricted to
performing quantum operations on blocks of several qubits.
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A Proof of an Operator Norm Inequality (Proposition 26)
We first recall some basic properties of the operator norm ‖A‖ := sup ‖A|ψ〉‖, where the
supremum is over all norm-1 vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H. First of all, it is easy to see that∥∥∥∥
(
A 0
0 B
)∥∥∥∥ = max {‖A‖, ‖B‖} .
Also, from the fact that ‖A‖ = sup |〈ψ|A|ϕ〉|, where the supremum is over all norm-1
|ψ〉, |ϕ〉 ∈ H, it follows that ‖A∗‖ = ‖A‖, where A∗ is the Hermitian transpose of A, and
thus that for Hermitian matrices A and B:
‖AB‖ = ‖(AB)∗‖ = ‖B∗A∗‖ = ‖BA‖ .
Furthermore, if A is Hermitian then ‖A‖ = λmax(A) := max{|λj | : λj an eigenvalue of A}.
Finally, the operator norm is unitarily invariant, i.e., ‖A‖ = ‖UAV ‖ for all A and for all
unitary U, V .
Lemma 25. Any two n × n matrices X and Y for which the products XY and Y X are
Hermitian satisfy
‖XY ‖ = ‖Y X‖
Proof. For any two n×n matrices X and Y , XY and Y X have the same eigenvalues, see
e.g. [Bha97, Exercise I.3.7]. Therefore, ‖XY ‖ = λmax(XY ) = λmax(Y X) = ‖Y X‖.
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We are now ready to state and prove the norm inequality. We recall that an orthogonal
projector P satisfies P 2 = P and P ∗ = P .
Proposition 26. For orthogonal projectors A1, A2, . . . , Am, it holds that∥∥A1 + . . . +Am∥∥ ≤ 1 + (m− 1) · max
1≤j<k≤m
∥∥AjAk∥∥.
The case m = 2 was proven in [DFSS05], adapting a technique by Kittaneh [Kit97].
We extend the proof to an arbitrary m.
Proof. Defining
X :=


A1 A2 · · · Am
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0

 and Y :=


A1 0 · · · 0
A2 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
Am 0 · · · 0


yields
XY =


A1 +A2 + . . .+Am 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0

 and Y X =


A1 A1A2 · · · A1Am
A2A1 A2 · · · A2Am
...
...
. . .
...
AmA1 AmA2 · · · Am


The matrix Y X can be additively decomposed into m matrices according to the following
pattern
Y X =


∗
∗
. . .
∗
∗

+


0 ∗
0
. . .
. . .
0 ∗
∗ 0

+ . . . +


0 ∗
∗ 0
. . .
. . .
0
∗ 0


where the ∗ stand for entries of Y X and for i = 1, . . . ,m the ith star-pattern after the
diagonal pattern is obtained by i cyclic shifts of the columns of the diagonal pattern.
XY and Y X are Hermitian and thus we can apply Lemma 25. Then, by applying the
triangle inequality, the unitary invariance of the operator norm and the facts that for all
j 6= k : ‖Aj‖ = 1, ‖AjAk‖ = ‖AkAj‖, we obtain the desired statement.
B Proof of Lemma 5
To prove Lemma 5, we need to introduce some more tools.
The following proposition guarantees that the “averaging property” of the guessing
probability (which holds by definition in the classical case) still holds when additionally
conditioning on a quantum system.
Proposition 27. For any state ρXY E ∈ D(HX ⊗ HY ⊗ HE) that is classical on X and
Y it holds that
pguess(X|Y E) =
∑
y
PY (y) pguess(X|E,Y = y).
31
Proof. First, note that for any matrix Mx acting on HY ⊗ HE, we can always write
Mx =
∑
y,y′ |y〉〈y′| ⊗My,y
′
x , where M
y,y′
x acts on HE for every x, y, y′. Now, we write
pguess(X|Y E) = max{Mx}
∑
x
PX(x)tr(Mxρ
x
Y E)
= max
{Mx}
∑
x
PX(x)tr(Mx
∑
y
PY |X(y|x) |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρx,yE )
= max
{Mx}
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)tr((
∑
v,w
|v〉〈w| ⊗Mv,wx )(|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρx,yE ))
= max
{Mx}
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)
∑
v
〈v|y〉tr(Mv,yx ρx,yE )
= max
{Mx}
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)tr(M
y,y
x ρ
x,y
E )
=
∑
y
PY (y) max{My,yx }
∑
x
PX|Y (x|y)tr(My,yx ρx,yE )
=
∑
y
PY (y) pguess(X|E,Y = y).
The following proposition is known as the chain rule for min-entropy.
Proposition 28 ([Ren05]). The following holds for all ρABC ∈ D(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC),
Hmin(A|BC) ≥ Hmin(AB|C)−Hmax(B).
Finally, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 29. For any state ρXY E ∈ D(HX ⊗ HY ⊗ HE) that is classical on X and Y it
holds that
Hmin(XE|Y = y) ≥ Hmin(X|Y = y) (10)
for every y ∈ Y.
Proof. Note that it suffices to show that λmax(ρ
y
XE) ≤ λmax(ρyX) holds for every y ∈ Y.
Because ρyXE is classical on X, there exists a unitary U acting on HX such that ρ˜yXE :=
(U ⊗ IE)ρyXE(U † ⊗ IE) is classical with respect to the computational basis {|x〉}x∈X on
HX with X := [d]. In particular, this means that ρ˜yXE has block-diagonal structure:
ρ˜yXE =
∑
x∈[d]
PX|Y (x|y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx,yE =


PX|Y (1|y) ρ1,yE 0
. . .
0 PX|Y (d|y) ρd,yE

 .
Note that because U is unitary, ρ˜yXE has the same eigenvalues as ρ
y
XE , where these eigen-
values are given by the union of the eigenvalues of the blocks on the diagonal of ρ˜yXE .
From this we see that the largest eigenvalue of ρ˜yXE (and thus of ρ
y
XE) cannot be larger
than the largest eigenvalue of ρ˜yX := trE(ρ˜
y
XE) (and thus of ρ
y
X).
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Proof of Lemma 5 . By (1) it is equivalent to show that
pguess(X|Y E) ≤ pguess(X|Y ) 2Hmax(E).
Using Proposition 27, we write
pguess(X|EY ) =
∑
y
PY (y) pguess(X|E,Y = y) =
∑
y
PY (y) 2
−H
min
(X|E,Y=y)
≤
∑
y
PY (y) 2
−(H
min
(XE|Y=y)−Hmax(E))
≤ 2Hmax(E)
∑
y
PY (y)2
−H
min
(X|Y=y) = 2Hmax(E) pguess(X|Y ),
where the first inequality is Proposition 28, and the second inequality follows by Lemma 29.
Hence, the claim follows.
C Proof of Lemma 15
Proof. Let α, β ∈ C be such that θi := {α|0〉 + β|1〉, β|0〉 − α|1〉}. (We can always find
such α and β.) Writing out the measurement explicitly gives
PYi|XiBiΘi(0|xi, bi, θi) = |(α〈0| + β〈1|)Hbi |xi〉|2 and
PYi|XiBiΘi(1|xi, bi, θi) = |(β〈0| − α〈1|)Hbi |xi〉|2.
Hence, it suffices to prove that
|(α〈0| + β〈1|)Hbi |xi〉|2 = |(β〈0| − α〈1|)Hbi |xi ⊕ 1〉|2 (11)
for every xi, bi ∈ {0, 1}.
We first show (11) for bi = 0. Let σ1 be the first Pauli matrix defined by σ1|a〉 = |a⊕1〉
for every a ∈ {0, 1}. It follows immediately from the definition that σ1 is a unitary matrix
and it is easy to see that σ1 is Hermitian. Then,
|(α〈0| + β〈1|)|xi〉|2 = |(α〈0| + β〈1|)σ1σ1|xi〉|2 = |(α〈1| + β〈0|)|xi ⊕ 1〉|2
= |(β〈0| − α〈1|)|xi ⊕ 1〉|2
The last equation follows because the expression equals either |α|2 or |β|2 (depending on
xi ∈ {0, 1}), hence we may freely change the sign of α. For bi = 1, we have
|(α〈0| + β〈1|)H|xi〉|2 = |(α〈0| + β〈1|)(|0〉 + (−1)xi |1〉)|2 = |α+ (−1)xiβ|2
and
|(β〈0| − α〈1|)H|xi ⊕ 1〉|2 = |(β〈0| − α〈1|)(|0〉 − (−1)xi |1〉)|2 = |β + (−1)xiα|2.
We see that those expressions are equal for every xi ∈ {0, 1}.
33
